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Book Reviews
Lord of Point Grey: Larry MacKenzie of UB.C, by P. B. Waite. U.B.C.
Press, 1988.276 pp. Illustrated. $21.95.
It takes two to tango and two to write a biography. Every account of a
life is an act of collusion of subject and author, whether they conspire
face-to-face or are separated by centuries. The author is constrained by
the material with which the subject consciously or inadvertently supplies
him and the subject is wholly dependent on the perception and integrity
of the biographer as to whether he will appear a hero or a villain. Either
way their product is an artifice, the person the subject was willing to
reveal skillfully enhanced or badly botched by the biographer.
P. B. Waite has been hugely fortunate in his subject, Norman
Archibald MacRae MacKenzie, known to his intimates as "Larry". Here
is a quintessential Canadian. Born in a modest Manse in Pugwash, Nova
Scotia, and schooled at Pictou Academy, he then laboured for four years
on a farm in Saskatchewan, survived four years in the trenches of World
War I (mostly with the Nova Scotia Highlanders, emerging without a
scratch, but with a Military Medal and bar, and a promised but never
confirmed commission), entered Law at Dalhousie, won a Carnegie
Fellowship to Harvard and then a renewal to take him to St. John's
College, Cambridge.
He moved to Geneva to become the assistant English-language legal
adviser at the League of Nations secretariat, and after four years of
cosmopolitan high-life in the loveliest setting in Europe, returned to
Canada, polished and lively of wit, as professor of international law at
Toronto. Ten years later, after a notable professorial career, he was
invited to assume the presidency of the University of New Brunswick;
after four years he moved to the University of British Columbia and there
found his place in history. The rest of the story, from 1944 to 1962, is of
his trials and triumphs, mostly the latter, as the driving force of that
callow institution, U.B.C. Within a few years he had made it, largely by
the force of his own character, into Canada's third senior league, full-
fledged university.
Nor was that all. This larger-than-life Canadian was physically
attractive, with the quiet strength of a farmer, the practicality of a soldier,
the gregariousness of an extravert, a keen native intelligence whetted and
honed by Dalhousie, Harvard and Cambridge, the savoir-faire of
cosmopolitan European society, and a ready pen which during his
Toronto years produced a flow of publications. Moreover, in Geneva he
Lord of Point Grey
met a very special person called Polly by her friends, fell deeply in love
with her and remained so all his life; but married a lady, truly estimable
in her own .ight, named Margaret, who was the mother of his children,
and in all his offices a fitting consort. In his elder statesman years he still
met and corresponded openly and frankly with Polly as only truly-
matched souls may do. Poverty, struggle, war, ivy-league, social graces,
triumphs, distinctions and romance: what more can any biographer ask'
for? A novelist who crammed so much into one short human existence
would be said to have stretched credulity.
But if Waite was fortunate with his subject, MacKenzie was equally if
not more fortunate with his biographer. For all the glamour and the rich
detail, Waite has taken his man seriously as a human being. What he has
written is no boys' magazine hero-extravaganza. Larry liked late-night
parties, when the drink was flowing, and some of the tales told in the
small hours have filtered through to the pages: Larry the sergeant telling
a cowering figure in a funk hole (in an edited version): "Get into the fight
because the Germans are a lesser risk than I am" - and meaning it;
Larry the Y.M.C.A. desk clerk picking up a drunken lout by his neck and
his pants and heaving him bodily into the street Larry of whom a U.B.C.
student was overheard saying to a visitor: "Professor X - oh, his office
is up there. But don't believe a word he says about the President - it's
not true". Such legends have their proper place; they are a part of the
whole, but they are not allowed to multiply too freely.
What is more important is the way in which Waite attempts to
perceive the serious intent of this life. Clearly, it did not remain
unvarying. When Larry was young he was intent on living and
experiencing - who would not be after four years of farm labour and
four years of war? In his middle years, as an international lawyer, he was
properly seized of an intellectual and a moral challenge. Was there, could
there be, a viable body of shared and acknowledged perceptions which
could guide the conduct of nations and be dignified with the designation
"international law"? For ten years at Toronto, following law school and
his apprenticeship in Geneva, it was his metier to find out. But then came
the more glamourous, more satisfying job at New Brunswick and
MacKenzie appears to have sloughed the coils of international law with
remarkable ease. Waite does not hide his conviction that his subject was
never truly an intellectual - he performed with immense competency
and enthusiasm the job before him, whether it was fighting a war,
grappling with international law or finding the necessities of life for the
ever-increasing numbers of U.B.C. students. They were all phases of
living his life with the greatest zest.
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One revealing passage concerns Larry MacKenzie and the Student
Christian Movement. Waite is to be highly commended that he takes
time to tell us what the S.C.M. in its heyday was, and how great its
influence was in post-World War I student circles (pp. 31-34) and of
Larry's successful role in it. But when he left Dalhousie he dropped the
whole thing. In a second reference to the subject Waite writes: "Some of
his Dalhousie friends felt that Larry's success with the Student Christian
Movement developed from his recognizing a good thing when he saw it.
This may well have been a canard, but the way Larry moved into the
organization and made himself master of it certainly lent itself to that
kind of interpretation. For he could start on the fringe of a movement and
by employing his talent for attracting young men and women, together
with his native energy for getting things done, he would soon be near or
at the centre of things. He was sincere about the S.C.M., as he was later
about international law and the League of Nations, but he took these up
with a speed and penetrated them with an ease that laid him open to the
charge of being a manipulator of men, issues and committees" (p. 168).
Some sour academics would add "in other words, he was a born
university president".
But there is another judgement to which Waite's account of
MacKenzie also gives us direction. MacKenzie, as a president, did truly
great things for his university. Perhaps no other person in those helter-
skelter postwar years could have done so much so speedily. Faced with
the flood of veterans seeking university entrance after demobilization (the
number of students in Canadian universities doubled in 1945-46)
MacKenzie, apparently at the suggestion of Gordon Shrum, his
resourceful chairman of Physics, decided to house his university in
disused army huts. Fifteen complete army camps along the coast and in
the interior were taken over, and 12 of them moved by truck or barge to
join the three already on Point Grey. In the final count, U.B.C. took over
the equivalent of 370 standard huts, and MacKenzie had secured housing
for his university. (Two of the huts were tastefully adapted to serve as the
President's residence.) Legends gathered around the exploits of Shrum
and his accomplices in spotting and expropriating the coveted buildings.
"When the U.B.C. fall term began in September, 1945, Larry announced
that formal authority to move the huts had come from Ottawa. A gale of
laughter ran through the students. They were already attending classes in
the transplanted buildings" (p. 124).
What Waite, with modest understatement, describes as "a curious
story" concerns the Faculty of Law. In the spring of 1945 MacKenzie
announced that the following September law students would be enrolled.
"At that point, the university had no buildings [for Law], no library, no
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money (except for $10,000 promised by Victoria), and no faculty apart
from Larry. If the worst came to the worst, he would have to teach
everything!" (p. 125).
George Curtis had been at Dalhousie Law School since 1934, and had
risen to the rank of Bennett Professor. In June, 1945 he was on his way
to Edmonton to consider becoming Dean of Law at the University of
Alberta. On the train he received a telegram: "Don't get off train. Come
to see us first. MacKenzi." Curtis continued on to Vancouver and was
Dean of U.B.C. Law school within weeks. In October he was in the office
of the Dean of Arts when Dean Buchanan said, "Forgive me interrupting,
but you may be interested. There is the Law School going by, along the
Mall." Curtis looked out of the window and, sure enough, it was. Two
army huts were being laboriously hauled on tractor-trailers. They were to
be the first home of the men of Law on the U.B.C. campus. Waite tells
the story with the panache it deserves, but does not linger to consider the
feelings of Dalhousie at losing their Bennett Professor so late in the school
year, or of the University of Alberta at having their prospective dean
snatched away from them. MacKenzie knew when to play the robber
baron, and in his first decade at U.B.C. he built a mighty fiefdom on the
West Coast.
The opportunity for MacKenzie's finest contribution to the cause of
Canadian education at large presented itself at the end of the decade in
the work of the Massey Commission. By that time he had been well
prepared for the assignment. He knew at first hand the plight of Canada's
universities from his experiences at the University of New Brunswick and
in British Columbia, and as chairman of the Postwar Needs Committee
of the National Conference of Canadian Universities he knew a great deal
about higher education institutions across the country generally. They
were (with one major exception, McGill, a privately-endowed
foundation) provincial institutions, and the provinces did not have access
to the kind of funding that was needed. "The nub of [the matter] was, as
Larry put it in a 1950 article in the Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, that Canadian universities simply could not educate
students without substantial increases in funding. Because of the
Canadian tax system, with that powerful lever controlled in Ottawa, the
logical, and in some ways the only, source of additional funds had to be
the federal government" (p. 145).
MacKenzie found a powerful ally in Principal E Cyril James of
McGill (he could hope for federal aid where he could not expect
provincial) though two men more unalike would have been hard to find.
James was an Englishman who had never become Americanized despite
his student days in Philadelphia and his decade and a half teaching in the
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United States. After a similar period in Canada he was thoroughly
Canadianized, but in the old imperial style which still thought of Canada
as a British dominion and of England as "home". In personal
relationships he was reserved, inhibited and self-conscious. He could
never have wandered into the union, grabbed a cup of coffee and sat
down among his students as one of them as Larry MacKenzie loved to
do. But in public performance or in official negotiations he was
unequalled. On the need for federal funding of Canadian universities the
two men were of one mind.
While MacKenzie was chairing the N.C.C.U. Postwar Needs
Committee James was chairing its Finance Committee, charged with
finding the means to meet the necessities that had been identified. It was
decided that an appeal should be made directly to the federal government
and James secured an interview with the Prime Minister. Louis St.
Laurent heard the presentation sympathetically, but said that first the
Canadian public must be made aware of the need for federal
intervention, and secondly, nothing could be done until the government
had received the report of the Royal Commission on Arts, Letters and
Sciences which he had appointed under the chairmanship of Vincent
Massey, the former High Commissioner in London (and future Governor
General of Canada). This response was encouraging, for MacKenzie had
himself been named a member of the Commission - as were also Hilda
Neatby, Professor of History at the University of Saskatchewan, and
Georges-Henri LUvesque, Dean of Social Sciences at Laval. The cards
appeared to be stacked in favour of the universities. James prepared and
presented a brief before the Commission and at the same time organized
a publicity campaign to inform the Canadian public of the dire need for
federal assistance. With James one side of the table arguing the case and
MacKenzie on the other largely influencing the result all appeared to be
going well.
Waite gives a detailed and, at times, very entertaining account of the
private life of the Commission, as revealed by MacKenzie's personal
papers, and adds an excellent thumbnail sketch of its chairman. Massey
was properly sensitive to the difficulties the situation presented. Georges-
Henri Lvesque gallantly came over to the supportive side: "Et j'ai
consenti! et bien librement! mgme si j'entendais ddjki dclater le tonnere
dans le ciel Qudbdcois!" But Massey still hesitated. "As for aid to the
universities, he said, it would be difficult to recommend, although the
other [members of the Commission] had agreed that they could
recommend money for scholarships ... But Massey was still shifting
towards Larry's position, and he was much impressed with the arguments
of Cyril James a few weeks before. As far as Larry was concerned any
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proposals to help the universities would meet with his approval; he added
a prescient suggestion from Jack Pickersgill [was] on the way to make a
stronger recommendation for university support more palatable" (153).
The "prescient suggestion" proved more plausible than logical, but it was
sufficient to tip the balance and the recommendation was made. It was
accepted by the government and on 19 June, 1951, St. Laurent
announced that effective for the academic year 1951-52, the Canadian
government would support Canadian universities.
Waite gives an excellent account of this great achievement, and of
MacKenzie's major role in it, although he stops short of pointing out that
by this devious route Canada had found its way to a national policy on
higher education. Nor does he comment (it was not part of his story) that
the new era of university financing had dawned for everyone except for
the man who had worked so effectively with MacKenzie to secure the
benefits. Cyril James ran into the blank wall of Quebec provincialism
and his university (like all others in the province) was forbidden by
Maurice Duplessis to accept the $600,000 the federal government was
prepared to give to McGill.
But universities in the rest of Canada were under no such prohibition,
and they had good reason to be grateful to their colleague from British
Columbia who had played a major role in securing the new dispensation.
In the early and middle '50s MacKenzie of U.B.C., Sidney Smith of
Toronto and Cyril James of McGill were the great trio of university
presidents who were notable figures on the national scene. Smith went on
to become Secretary of State for External Affairs in John Diefenbaker's
second government. In the next decade provincialism everywhere
prevailed, and the other provinces followed where Quebec had led.
Federal funding was diverted to flow through the provincial capitals and
university presidents had perforce to become immersed in local politics.
The days when Canada could hammer out a national policy of higher
education were over.
MacKenzie knew that in the work of the Massey Commission he had
participated in achieving a triumph, not merely with regard to university
education but with regard to the cultivation of the arts generally. Waite
tells us that he even sent the two volumes, the Report and the bound copy
of studies that accompanied it, to Polly at her home in England. "She was
enthusiastic ... How wonderful, she said, to be a Canadian! 'How right
you were,' she told Larry, 'those long years ago to return"' (p. 167).
Reviewing what he had accomplished in his several roles, we are very
ready to concur.
The story, therefore, takes on a sense of greatness in decay, a
dimension of the tragic, when Waite has to be true to his material and
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record that in MacKenzie's later years at U.B.C. from 1955-62, the traits
which had appeared only briefly earlier came more and more to
dominate. "Larry himself had come a long way. He had developed his
share of the seven deadly sins, but the worst was pride. The older he
grew, and the more achievements he put behind him, the more his
consciousness of them grew" (p. 167). His concern for the university was
overtaken by his concern for his position in it. After he had fought and
argued and connived to get his university what it needed, he appeared to
have lost perception why he had done it. Consequently, gaps began to
appear in the identification of U.B.C. and its president. First, persons,
then departments and whole disciplines began to pull away from the
president's personal magnetism; criticisms began to make themselves
audible in the inner circles; impatience with his lack of understanding
bred ridicule in the lower ranks. The story of the decline and fall of
MacKenzie is very sad. Once the university had gotten away from him he
had, it appears, no intellectual convictions on which to fall back, no
academic faith or joy in seeing others take up and carry on to further
success what he had so nobly begun. He saw, it would seem, only that the
university had pushed him out.
This is a book which one is loathe to criticize because as a whole it has
been so well done. But one judges that Waite might have shortened for
us his account of the long, lingering decay of this great man, after his
unhappy resignation - or rather, dismissal. The author has also indulged
surely in "a meticulosity of notification" - at times we feel that Larry
MacKenzie cannot sneeze but we must be given chapter and verse for it.
But many would class that as a good fault. After one has closed the book,
one wonders at the title and dust jacket: "Lord of Point Grey", a regal
figure in all his academic splendour. The real MacKenzie, we have been
told, liked to put on the airs of a rustic fellow, and chose often to speak
like one, and loved to be hail-fellow-well-met with campus staff and
students alike. Wouldn't "Boss of Grey Point" in an old woollen pullover
have been more fitting?
But then we remember that MacKenzie was also "inordinately proud"
of being made a director of the Bank of Nova Scotia, and also of his 21
honorary degrees, and of his three bronze busts, one at U.B.C., one at
New Brunswick and one at his alma mater, Dalhousie. So there was also
a lordly side to Norman Archibald MacRae MacKenzie as well as the
gregarious rustic, either character waiting to be assumed as occasion
required. He was only rustic when the wind lay in the north-northwest.
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P. B. Waite has handled his complex subject with perceptive
understanding, and the mass of papers involved with great dexterity.
Author and subject may indeed congratulate themselves; they have
served each other well, and between them have produced a first-rate
biography.
Stanley B. Frost
McGill University
Montreal
184 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Canadian .Criminal Jury Instructions, by G.A. Ferguson & J.C. Bouck.
Vancouver: The Continuing Legal Education Society of British
Columbia, 1987. pp 1600. $195.00
Canadian Criminal Jury Instructions ("CRIMJI") is an ambitious
project. The authors, the Honourable Mr. Justice John Bouck (of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia) and Professor Gerry Ferguson (of
the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria) set out to provide a book that
will "assist Canadian judges and Canadian lawyers in drafting and
delivering a charge to a jury in a criminal case".' The authors' two-
volume work handily accomplishes this objective.
It should be unnecessary to seek justification for such a work beyond
the obvious. The work can't help but positively contribute to the work of
judges faced with the delivery of a charge to a jury in a criminal case and,
as well, to the work of lawyers in drafting their addresses in the same
circumstances. The authors, however, do provide justification. The
authors conducted two surveys which they report on. The first survey
involved considering all of the appeals of jury charges to the Supreme
Court of Canada between 1974 and 1984. Of 33 cases examined, in 55
per cent of the cases the charge was upheld without adverse comment. In
12 per cent of the cases the charge was found to be wrong, but the
Supreme Court of Canada concluded there had been no substantial
miscarriage of justice and applied the curative provisions of the Criminal
Code. In 33 per cent of the cases the charge was found to be sufficiently
in error to require a new trial.2 The second survey involved examining
cases reported in one of the series of criminal reports between the years
1981-1985 involving appeals of jury charges to the Ontario Court of
Appeal. Of 47 appealed jury charges, the Ontario Court of Appeal
upheld 23 (14 by virtue of the curative provision) but ordered a new trial
in 24 cases.3 While these statistics may not be statistically conclusive
(something the authors acknowledge), they are helpful in restating what
appears to be an obvious point - charging a jury can be a difficult
business both because of the intellectual complexity of the notions that
have to be communicated and the very difficult working conditions in
which some of the charges are drafted; any tool that assists in the process
cannot help but make a beneficial contribution to the quality of criminal
justice.
CRIMJI consists of 10 separate chapters dealing with various aspects
of the charge that a trial judge must necessarily consider in a criminal
1. Ferguson, G.A. and Bouck, J.C., Canadian Criminal Jury Instructions (Vancouver. The
Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 1987), at 1.
2.Id, at2.
3. Id, at2.
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case: Opening Comments To The Jury Panel (Chapter 1), Instructions
Given During The Course Of The Trial (Chapter 2), Directed Verdicts
(Chapter 3), Introductory Instructions And Instructions On The
Evidence Following The Submissions Of Counsel (Chapter 4), Parties To
Offences (Chapter 5), Offences (Chapter 6), Included Offences (Chapter
7), Defences (Chapter 8), Closing Remarks (Chapter 9) and Post-charge
Instructions (Chapter 10). In addition there are a series of appendices and
the usual supporting material such as a table of cases, a table of statutes,
a list of references and an index.
Each chapter consists of a series of discrete, general topics. Each
general topic is introduced by a table of contents that broadly describes
the contents covered in the topic. The treatment of the topic usually
consists of several paragraphs, often separated by subheadings for
particular paragraphs or groups of paragraphs. The subheadings are
identified in the table of contents. The language used throughout is as
plain and simple as the circumstances permit. Where the authors feel
authority is called for to support a suggested portion of the charge, the
authority is set out in the footnotes, which are found at the end of each
separate topic. This general format should prove helpful.
The authors acknowledge that for a variety of reasons CRIMJI will
not be, and should not be, slavishly and universally applied. Obviously a
judge may have her4 own way of expressing commonplace ideas which
she may well prefer.5 Some instructions will not be found in CRIMJI as
CRIMJI does not attempt to cover every possible offence that may be
tried by a criminal jury.6 Some of the editorial decisions the authors have
made may not find favour with a particular judge. As an example, the
authors adopted the rule that they would not make any substantial
departure from the language of a statute and little or no change in the
words used by higher courts in their suggested charges. They suggest that
if it is difficult to make sense out of a statute because of antiquated or
abstruse wording, or if it is hard to understand the language used by the
higher courts, then the safest course to follow is to leave the words alone
and repeat them as found, providing examples of supplementary
explanations where possible.7 Some judge may feel less comfortable with
this approach than others. However, given all this, the format allows the
reader to easily access the relevant topic, consider the authors'
suggestions, and consider the authority that the learned authors rely on.
4. 1 use the feminine pronoun throughout. It includes the masculine.
5. Which the authors acknowledge, supra, note 1, at 11.
6. Id
7.Id. at 12.
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Where a judge decides to go from that point is up to her, but at least she
starts with a reasoned, considered, and substantial first draft.
The looseleaf format of the work means that, where this is thought
helpful, the reader (judge or lawyer) can remove the appropriate section
of the work, photocopy it (which the authors suggest be done, thus
presumably countenancing the violation of copyright involved) and make
any additions or revisions that the reader wishes to make directly on the
photocopied "draft".
There are some questions about form that could be raised. The authors
use a "he/she" formulation frequently in the text, suggesting that the
reader strike out the alternative that is incorrect in the particular case. I
think it preferable to choose one or the other of the pronouns, footnote
the first use (as I have done in this review), and thereafter use only one
throughout (a formulation the authors partially adopt in the text). Often
a blank is left, followed by "(The Accused)" or some other formulaic
instruction. In many of these cases it might have been preferable to
simply delete the blank and use the formulaic instruction as part of the
text. It would be helpful to have a table of contents chapter by chapter
(as well as topic by topic within a chapter). In using a reference book
such as CRIMJI it is often inconvenient to go back to the initial table of
contents in order to find your way around within a chapter. However, all
of these comments as to style and form are quibbles. In general the book
is, in terms of style and format, very readable and usable. The
proofreading has been exceptional (I detected no proofreading errors),
the type is easy to read and the layout is admirable.
The substantive content of CRIMJI is very broad. CRIMJI does not
attempt to give an elaborate, comprehensive, doctrinal treatment of the
areas being considered. Rather it sets out the distilled result as understood
by the authors, giving authority where necessary, and issuing warnings
that the authors think appropriate. In my opinion it does this
exceptionally well. I illustrate this by the treatment of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The suggested instruction on reasonable doubt is:
You may ask "what does proof beyond a reasonable doubt mean?"
There is no simple answer to this question. A reasonable doubt may
arise from the evidence, a conflict in the evidence, or a lack of
evidence. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason. It is not
an imaginary doubt. It is the sort of doubt for which you could give
a logical and rational explanation, if asked. 8
8.Id, at 4A-15
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There are two footnotes. The first warns "that a judge who attempts to
further define reasonable doubt does so at his or her own peril ' 9, giving
authority and some discussion. The second footnote warns that a similar
formulation (presumably that in the last two lines) was disapproved of in
an English authority but that there is support in Canada for the
formulation.'0
Unfortunately CRIMJI uses a bad example of circumstantial evidence.
In the section on direct and circumstantial evidence the authors describe
direct and circumstantial evidence thus:
Types of Evidence - Direct and Circumstantial.
1. Before commenting on the evidence in this case, I must give you
a particular warning about circumstantial evidence. There are two
types of evidence in any criminal case. One is direct evidence. The
other is circumstantial evidence. Both direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence are admissible as a means of proof.
Sometimes circumstantial evidence is more persuasive than direct
evidence. The evidence of one witness may contradict that of
another, but the cirsumstances of an event are often not in dispute.
I will explain the difference between these two types of evidence by
way of example.
Example - Direct Evidence
2. Suppose John Doe is on trial for murder. A witness testifies that
he saw John Doe shoot the victim. The witness says that John Doe
raised a gun and pulled the trigger. The witness then heard a bang
and saw the victim fall to the ground. This is direct evidence that
John Doe shot the victim. Direct evidence has two possible sources
of error. First, the witness might be lying for one reason or another.
Second, the witness might be mistaken. For example, the witness
might make a mistake in identification of the person who shot the
victim. If the witness is not lying or mistaken, the proper conclusion
is that John Doe shot the victim.
Example - Circumstantial Evidence
3. On the other hand, suppose nobody actually saw John Doe
shoot the victim. However, a witness testifies that she heard a noise
like a gunshot, and went into the room where the noise came from.
In that room she found John Doe standing over the victim, and
John Doe had a smoking gun in his hand. This is circumstantial
evidence that John Doe shot the victim. Again, it is possible that the
9.1d, at 4A-17
10.Id,
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witness is lying or mistaken. However, in the case of circumstantial
evidence, there is a third possible source of error - it is possible to
draw the wrong conclusion from the circumstances. Let me expand
on this a bit. Suppose the witness in our second example is being
truthful and accurate. John Doe was standing over the victim and
he was holding a smoking gun in his hand. It is still possible that
John Doe did not shoot the victim. For example, John Doe might
have been outside the room when the victim was shot and come
into the room before the witness did, unconcsciously picked up the
smoking gun, and bent over the victim to see if he was still alive. If
this were the case, it would be wrong to conclude that John Doe
had shot the victim, even though the witness is not lying or
mistaken."
The difficulty is with the example of direct evidence. The example
involves the witness drawing an inference from the circumstances, that
the pointing of the gun, the sound of the discharge of the gun, and the
victim falling to the ground are somehow related. With respect, that
scenario is not direct evidence that the accused shot the victim. Direct
evidence would require that the witness see the slug leave the gun and
enter the victim. The example is circumstantial evidence. It may turn out,
given other evidence called, to be compelling circumstantial evidence, or,
even on its own, it may be found to be compelling circumstantial
evidence, but it is not direct evidence, and, with respect, it should not be
described as such. Having made this criticism I should note that the
authors need not feel too badly about the example. First, it is commonly
used as an example of the difference between direct and circumstantial
evidence. Second, it received prior published circulation in Canada
apparently without adverse comment.12 Third, even this inaccurate
example is incredibly more helpful than the brief suggested instructions in
some standard American equivalent works.13
CRIMJI was an immense undertaking. Its production is a tribute to
the authors' energy, perseverance and dedication. Its quality is a tribute
to their experience, ability and creativity. CRIMJI will be immensely
helpful to judges conducting criminal trials throughout Canada. It will
likewise, particularly as it begins to be adopted and used by trial judges,
be an authority that no criminal lawyer can ignore in her preparation for
11. Id, at 4B-12 to 4B-14.
12. Kennedy, J. De. N., Aids to Jury Charges (Criminal), (Agincourt: Canada Law Book,
1975) at 37-38.
13. See, for example Manual of Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit (St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1984) at 9, and Devitt, Edward J. and Blackman, Charles B., Federal Jury
Practice and Institutions (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1970) at 208.
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an address to a jury. For a trial judge not to make reference to it in
assisting her in the difficult task of charging a jury would be difficult to
justify. For counsel, knowing that the trial judge may charge the jury in
the language of CRIMJI in due course, not to cunningly reflect that
language in counsel's address would be unforgivable.
James P. Taylor
Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
Member, Bar of British Columbia
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The Tokyo War Crimes TriaL Edited by C. Hosoya and Others. N.Y.:
Harper & Row, for Kodansha International, Tokyo, 1986. Pp. 226.
Until comparatively recently (see, eg., The Other Nuremberg by Arnold
C. Brackman, 1987) there has been little written in western countries
concerning the International Military Tribunal for the Far East - the
Tokyo Tribunal - when compared with its "sister" Tribunal at
Nuremberg. The compilation of Principles drawn up by the United
Nations is known as the Nuremberg Principles regardless of the fact that
the same principles were applied in Tokyo. In 1983, to coincide with the
first Japanese showing of the film The Tokyo Trial premiered in New
York two years later, an International Symposium on the Trial was held
in Tokyo. Papers were presented from four perspectives - international
law, history, the contribution to the quest for peace, and the trial's
contemporary significance. The present volume reproduces the texts of
the papers delivered at that Symposium, and though most of the
participants were Japanese an attempt was made to preserve a measure
of objectivity and balance.
Unlike Nuremberg, the tribunal in Tokyo was established by General
MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and not by
treaty. Moreover, it was made up of judges nominated by the eleven
countries most intimately involved as opponents of Japan, rather than, as
at Nuremberg, by the four major allies as representative of the whole
United Nations alliance against Germany. The Dutch and youngest
member of the Tokyo Tribunal - a mere 39 - was B.V. R6ing who
produced the earliest English record of the trial in 1977. He not only
provided a paper for the symposium on the Trial and the Quest for Peace,
but also wrote the introduction to this version of the record, and it is to
his memory that the volume is dedicated.
R6ling was among those who had reservations as to the fairness of the
Trial, and states in his Introduction that "although I often disagreed with
decisions about procedure, the unfairness never reached a point where I
felt compelled to resign my position as a judge" (p. 19). He was also
critical of the conduct of Sir William Webb, the president of the tribunal
(Brackman, p. 382), a view which had been expressed by the current
reviewer as early as 1948 (Green, "Law and Administration in Present-
Day Japan", 1 Current Legal Problems 188, at 200). Unlike Nuremberg,
there was no overall unanimity among the judges. In Europe only the
Soviet judge was critical of the leniency of some of the sentences, but he
did not really dissent. At Tokyo, there were dissents, of which the most
important was that by Pal J. of India. R6ling himself supported the
acquittal of five of the accused, including General Hata, although he later
wrote that "since the appearance of evidence concerning biological
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weapons, I no longer feel the same degree of certainty in regard to
General Hata. For it is quite conceivable that he was involved in this
criminal enterprise, or at least knew of it" (p. 18). On this subject he has,
in another statement, been far more brutal in his comments. He stated
that the United States should be "ashamed because of the fact that they
withheld information from the Court with respect to the biological
experiments of the Japanese in Machuria on Chinese and American [and
Soviet] prisoners of war... As one of the judges in the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, it is a bitter experience for me to be
informed now that centrally ordered Japanese war criminality of the
most disgusting kind was kept secret from the Court by the U.S.
government" (Brackman, p. 200).
Many readers of R6ling's Introduction may feel, as does the present
reviewer, that by the time he wrote this, whatever may have been his
feelings as a Dutch lawyer after the liberation of Dutch colonial
territories wherein atrocities of the worst kind had been committed, he
was more concerned with political idealogy than he was with legal
principles. This is particularly true in relation to his comments on
aggression, the function of war and the peace movement (pp. 21-27),
though few will argue with his remark that "the elimination of war
demands tolerance and a readiness to make sacrifices on behalf of peace.
The price of peace may be high and entail unpleasant consequences, such
as restrictions on sovereignty in many areas. Only the deep conviction of
the absolute impermissibility of war can further the willingness to make
such sacrifices. Reviving the memories of World War II, including the
atrocities and the judgments, has the merit of contributing to that deep
awareness of that repugnance of war that mankind needs in order to
survive" (pp. 26-27). The political character of Rling's approach is clear
from his account of how the "crime" of aggressive war developed (pp.
115-128). One might expect from a former international judge that he
would sustain some of his dogmatic statements by legal reasoning. Far
from doing so, however, Riling considered it adequate to state
simpliciter, "it is an irony of history that the illegal and criminal
American atomic bombs probably contributed to the conviction that
Japanese aggression had been criminal .... Moreover.., the United
States had insisted that international tribunals should be established by
which the world would confirm that wars of aggression were illegal and
criminal, thereby vindicating the American violation of neutrality laws"
(pp. 128, 129, italics added). Interestingly, he had earlier attributed to
Stalin the desire to see aggression made criminal and those responsible
therefor brought to justice (p. 126). In fine, he was of opinion that the
most significant factor of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials was "that the
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essence of the applied law is that individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligation of obedience imposed by the
individual state. Now that governments seem to be entangled in
irresponsible militarism - now tht it becomes even more clear that only
the collective will of the people can save humanity from extinction
[-how?-] - the judgments of Nuremberg and Tokyo have become an
indictment against the present behaviour of the superpowers" (p. 133,
italics added).
The two Japanese papers on Tokyo and the quest for peace are
personal and subjective. Tsurumi Shusuke, described as a philospher,
points out that to a great extent Japanese reaction to the Trial was that
the accused were "unlucky" and the trial was "a strange historical trick"
(p. 145), especially since Korea and Vietnam had led them "to assume a
stance of ironic skepticism toward the confident pronouncement of
Japan's guilt handed down by the Allied powers in Tokyo" (p. 139). In
contrast to these views are the blunt statements by playwright Kinoshita
Junji who states that his "failure to pursue the responsibility of Japanese
for the war is the greatest regret of my life" (p. 149). Even though he had
no part in policy-making he questions whether he can honestly say that
he was totally innocent: "What if I had had the right to speak out
publicly during the war? What would I have done? What if I'd had to
speak out: Could I really say that I would not have collaborated with the
war effort? It was true that I entered society after with my hands clean.
But wasn't this in fact nothing more than a result of not having a voice
in matters during the war? There is absolutely no guarantee that I would
not have supported the war if my age and social position had forced me
to do so... [However,] those who would pursue responsibility for a war,
who would criticize or accuse others, are unqualified to do so unless they
are painfully aware that they too, as human beings, contain within
themselves the potential for acts that would expose them to criticism and
accusation. Perhaps, therefore, it is precisely cirticism and accusation of
this kind, based on a hard self-awareness, that can have meaning and,
having meaning, be effective. In short, I believe that only those who are
capable of feeling the pain of guilt that stings themselves can sting
others." (p. 15).
When discussing the Tokyo trial in its historical perspective, the
historian Kojima Noboru asserts that "the Tokyo trial was unprece-
dented, and I doubt that a similar trial will ever be held in the future. Yet,
... the Tokyo trial potentially had great significance in promoting
understanding and mutual reflection between East and West... The very
act of tracing the steps of Japan's past history with care and dispassion
should have created a deeper understanding of Japan, as well as of the
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actual situation in the various Asian countries into which Japan
advanced under its 'mainland policy' and its other policies. At the same
time, it should have been an opportunity to promote mutal understanding
between the countries of Asia, as well as understanding of the
relationship between Asia and the West. Given the fact that war often
arises from a lack of mutual understanding, I believe that promoting
understanding of Japan and Asia can become an important basis for the
prevention of future wars and the preservation of peace, which was the
goal of the Tokyo trial" (p. 70). Given that mutual misunderstanding may
well cause war or conflict, it is perhaps asking a lot of the victims of
Japanese atrocities to have used the opportunity of the trial to advance
understanding Japan and its motives. It is hardly surprising that "this was
not the perspective adopted at the Tokyo trial. Instead, emphasis was
placed on the hasty trial and punishment of the atrocities that had been
committed by a defeated Japan" (ibid). Mr. Kojima deplores the fact
that "the view of Japanese history put forward by the prosecution and
expressed in the majority opinion - that is, the 'war crimes view' of
Japanese history - continues to be accepted totally and uncritically ....
[I]n Japan at that time, the Tokyo trial was not perceived merely as a trial
that brought certain wartime leaders to account, but rather a
condemnation of Japanese history itself. Moreover, while the terms have
a bad connotation, the trial gave birth to an atmosphere in which Japan
was viewed as a 'criminal state' and the Japanese people as a 'criminal
people'... . That this tendency to treat Japan as an 'ex-con' has deep
roots in some foreign countries, too, is evident from the accounts of
Japan in their schoolbooks.... [A]ccepting this historical view in toto
also has the effect of closing the way to genuine research on international
history... . [T]he Tokyo trial is not simply an object of retrospection or
something that concerns Japan only.... [I]t should become a kind of
stimulant, or starting point, for historical research, showing all of us the
unvarnished reality of each other's past. That is precisely what would give
renewed life to the Tokyo trial, which has become a brake on
international understanding, and give the trial a role in contributing to
world peace" (p. 78).
Perhaps if Japan were more willing to remove from places of authority
in government and industry those whose records are far from
unblemished, particularly in regard to chemical experimentation, and
were not so determined to "clean" its schoolbooks of any indication of
Japanese wrongdoing or aggression against its neighbours, these words
might ring more ture. While saying this, it should not be overlooked that
in his paper Professor Awaya Kentaro bluntly stated that "perhaps the
most horrible acts of the Japanese army were not prosecuted by the
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Tokyo tribunal.... Unit 731 of the Guandong Army conducted germ
warfare experiments, including vivisection, on more than three thousand
prisoners of war from China and other countries.... At the time of the
Tokyo trial, the Soviet Union vigorously demanded the investigation and
punishment of [Lieutenant General] Ishii and his staff. GHQ did not
respond to these demands [in fact American commentators denounced
these demands and a Soviet trial as propaganda exercises; see, e.g., The
Japanese on Trial by P.R. Piccigallo, 1974, pp. 150-156]. It is said that
Ishii and others escaped prosecution by turning over to the United States
the data on their experiments and their use of germ and chemical warfare
in the field.... [B]ehind the immunity granted Unit 731, I detect the
national self-interest of the United States, which was willing to grant
immunity to criminals in order to secure a monopoly on the most up-to-
date information concerning techniques of warfare" (pp. 85-6). He goes
on to say, however, destroying much of the mea culpa of this comment,
"I cannot help feeling that this mentality has something in common with
the decision to place the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan outside the
jurisdiction of the court." Regardless of the legality or otherwise of these
attacks, it is submitted that by this remark, common to much Japanese
reaction to the trial, he shows a failure to understand the nature and
jurisdiction of the tribunal.
From the legal point of view it is perhaps the papers delivered at the
opening session - "The Tokyo Trial from the Perspective of
International Law" - that are of most interest to lawyers. For the main
part, Professor Lounev of the Soviet Academy of Science Institute of
State and Law confined himself to a factual summary of the background
of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, but he went on to assert that
the two judgments "serve as an important moral and legal weapon in the
struggle for peace and against the preparation and waging of aggressive
wars, in which nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are used.
... Under present conditions, when progressive forces all over the world
struggle for peace and the prevention of nuclear war, when in some
countries aggressive tendencies are growing and military conflicts are
being provoked, it is very important to strengthen friendship among
peoples. At the same time, we should not forget that those persons who
committed crimes on occupied territories during World War II, who
committed crimes at prisoner-of-war camps, who committed atrocities
against civilian populations - all bear criminal responsibility. Many war
criminals are still hiding in the U.S.A., some countires of South America,
Canada, West Germany, and other countries .... Unfortunately, the
governments of some countries do not observe the resolution of the
General Assembly and refuse to extradite war criminals on the demand
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of the Soviet Government and the governments of other countries" (pp.
35-6). This comment has, to some extent, been overrun by historic
developments. The speaker's political bias is seen by his criticisms of the
organization of the tribunal. Despite his statement that "in constituting
and conducting the Tokyo tribunal, the experience and the charter of the
Nuremberg tribunal were widely used" (p. 35), he complains of
"shortcomings in the organization and functioning of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East. First, the charter of the tribunal was
not prepared on a collective basis by the states participating in the trial.
... [1It was draftedpersonally by the supreme commander of the Allied
forces, General MacA rthur[!]. Apart from that, it somehow contradicts
legal tradition that the president of the tribunal was not elected by the
members of the tribunal [are Chief Justices usually so chosen?] but was
appointed by General MacArthur himself. The chief prosecutor was also
appointed by General MacArthur, unlike Nuremberg where all
prosecutors from participating countries had equal rights and participated
on an equal footing. And, from our point of view, it does not seem a very
democratic procedure when defence counsel from the United States were
allowed to participate in the trial even though they were from a country
that was at the same time prosecuting the war criminals" (pp. 36-7, italics
added). One is inclined to enquire the nationality of defence counsel in
the Soviet Union, or elsewhere.
Perhaps the clearest example of Professor Lounev's political approach
is seen in his assertion that "the crimes committed by German and
Japanese war criminals during World War II are being repeated now by
the Israeli aggressors in the Middle East and the aggressors of the
Republic of South Africa, who provoke military conflicts, wage
aggressive wars, violate international laws and customs of war, kill
people, and deport civilian populations from the territories in which they
were born and lived" (pp. 34-5).
A more specifically legal approach was taken by Professor Ipsen of the
Ruhr University, although here, too, we see national biases coming into
play. Having pointed out that Japan had by the Instrument of Surrender
undertaken to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration,
including that for the prosecution of war criminals, and having referred
to the rights of an occupant under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
1907, he maintained that "[n]either the wording nor the object and
purpose of the Instrument of Surrender, or of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, could be taken as a legal basis for the argument that the
powers of the supreme commander included the right to establish a
jurisdiction that was unknown until that time in international law or in
municipal Japanese law" (p. 38). Insofar as a claim to exercise
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international, as distinct from municipal Japanese jurisdiction is
concerned, he maintained that "the charter of the I.M.T. exceeded the
framework of the existing international law [in that] it changed state
responsibility for the breach of treaty obligations into individual
responsibility; second, it took individual responsibility as the basis for a
newly created international criminal law. Therefore, the jurisdiction of
the tribunal with regard to crimes against peace remains doubtful" (p.
41). As to war crimes, "defendants who were prisoners of war had to be
treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1929. It was within
the jurisdiction of the detaining powers to try them, and to punish them,
for violations of the laws or customs of war in conformity with Articles
45, 60 and 63 of the Geneva Convention, as well as for offenses
committed before they had been captured. Second, according to
customary law already developed before World War II, defendants other
than prisoners of war could be tried and punished by courts martial of the
occupying powers within the limits set up in Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations. These findings raise doubts about the jurisdiction of the
Tokyo IMT, which clearly was a court-martial and did not apply the law
of the detaining powers" (p. 42). On the other hand, he concedes that
crimes against humanity might be considered as being within the concept
of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations as prescribed
by Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court. "For decades the legal
order of every civilized nation had provided for trial and punishment in
cases of offenses such as murder, extermination, and similar inhumane
acts. Therefore, within these limits, crimes against humanity may be
derived from a recognized source of international law. Until Nuremberg
and Tokyo there was no precedent in international law for jurisdiction
over such crimes to be conferred on an international tribunal; still, by
virtue of the Hague 'Regulations it was a lawful act to establish such
jurisdiction. For its Article 43 empowers the occupying powers 'to take
all the measures ... to restore ... public order ... while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.' The urgent
necessity of establishing the jurisdiction of an international tribunal for
such grave offences as crimes against humanity was an exceptional case
under this provision. Therefore, with regard to crimes against humanity,
the I.M.T. has an assured basis in the international law then in force. To
the extent that the jurisdiction of the I.M.T. extended to persecutions
committed in the execution of or in connection with any other crime
within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, that jurisdiction exceeded the limits
of international law then in force. Therefore, the definition of crimes
against humanity did involve a decisive expansion of existing
international law" (p. 42). He considers the conspiracy charge to be a
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denial of the concept of individual responsibility and, in any case, to be
a concept only known in Anglo-American law, "and even there it has
been contested by learned lawyers" (p.43).
Professor Ipsen concludes by pointing out that, in the Calley cases, in
the instructions from the military judge to the court, "there was not a
single reference to similar international precedents [there was of course
no need for any such reference in view of the law under which Calley
was tried]. ... In the light of development and state practice since
Nuremberg and Tokyo, we must conclude unhappily that the law of both
charters has been neither reaffirmed by treaty nor developed into
customary law" (p. 44). Thus are the Resolutions of the General
Assembly and the opiniojuris developed since 1945 cavalierly dismissed!
Finally, Professor Onuma Yasuaki deals with the trial "Between Law
and Politics", starting from the premise that "the Tokyo trial was unfair.
As at the Nuremberg trial, the Tokyo tribunal judged only the Axis
power involved. Japan was not even allowed to raise as issues the actions
of the Allied powers, which include the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki by the United States [on this issue it might be of assistance
to the reader to look at the reviewer's paper on nuclear weapons and the
law of armed conflict in Cohen and Gouin, Lawyers and the Nuclear
Debate, 1988, 91, particularly the analysis of the Tokyo court's decision
in the Shimoda case] and the violation of the neutrality.., by the Soviet
Union .... This aspect of unfairness - the fact that the tribunal had the
character of a political trial - is one of the major factors leading to
cynicism about the Tokyo trial. For many people, the Tokyo trial proved
the maxim that 'might makes right' " (p. 45). Like so many. of the
participants in this discussion, Professor Onuma joins those who
maintain that "the postwar conduct of the countries that judged the Axis
powers in the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo has seriously detracted from
the significance of the Tokyo trial. Consider, for example, America's war
in Vietnam, the Soviet Union's suppression of the Hungarian revolt, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the British-French expedition in the
Suez Canal incident. From the standpoint of the legal principles of Tokyo
and Nuremberg, it is quite obvious that the leaders of these countries
should have been called to account for the illegal use of armed force. As
you all know, this had never happened" (p. 46). Two points need to be
made with regard to this statement. First, he did not consider it necessary
to cite, as did his Soviet co-panelist, the activities of Israel or South
Africa. Second, the fact that the leaders of the countries he names have
not been tried - assuming that his accusation of guilt is substanial - in
no way detracts from the correctness of the deliberations and verdict at
Tokyo.
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Interestingly, Professor Onuma makes a point that many Japanese
would consider equivalent to sacrilege, while western commentators have
tended to skirt the same issue. "The political character of the trial is
manifest in the treatment of the emperor, who under the Meiji
Constitution bore ultimate responsibility for the war. The tribunal not
only failed to call the emperor to account for Japan's war of aggression,
but did not even summon him as a witness" (pp. 45-6). To some extent,
this failure reflected western appreciation of the special status of the
emperor in the Japanese ethos. Since Hirohito was struck by his last
illness it became clear that, regardless of anything to be found in the
MacArthur-imposed, Japanese-acquiesced-to Constitution, large
segments of the Japanese population would continue to regard the
Emperor as a descendant of Amanoterasu and at least quasi-divine. It
remains to be seen how the new dynasty will shape. According to The
Ecomomist (October 1, 1988, p. 34) there are strong indications that
"Japan's national psyche will be liberated from the bitter memory of
1945". If that is so perhaps the dream of Prince Ito will bear fruit and we
will see the re-establishment of the Meiji Constitution - and with it a
clear rejection of the Tokyo judgment with its condemnation of Japan as
an aggressor. It would be interesting to read the papers presented to a
similar seminar at such a time.
L.C. Green
University of Alberta
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Behind Closed Doors: How the Rich Won Control of Canada's Tax
System... And Ended up Richer, by Linda McQuaig (Toronto: Viking,
1987). pp. 353.
Linda McQuaig is not an expert. Therein lies an important strength of her
book on the Canadian tax system, Behind Closed Doors: How The Rich
Won Control of Canada's Tax System ... And Ended Up Richer.
Because she is not an expert she has not relied on an insider's knowledge
of technical points and jargon and neither has she gotten caught up in a
particular disciplines's specialist concerns. Rather, as a good journalist,
she has provided a lucid critique of the tax system which will be of
interest to anyone concerned with how the tax system is or how it came
to be.
The thesis of McQuaig's book is, as the title suggests, that the rich have
unduly influenced the formation of tax policy in Canada with the result
that the tax system greatly favours them. In support of her contention
McQuaig constructs a careful case. Her approach is basically historical.
After an introductory chapter, the rest of the book describes the evolution
of the Canadian tax system from the early 1960s to the present. Though
this sounds like dry stuff, it is not. The discussion of the intricacies of tax
preferences, incentives, or loopholes, (the terminology depends on one's
ideaology), as well as new ways of viewing the tax system such as the tax
expenditure concept, is informed and enlivened by her portraits of the
important players of the times.
McQuaig's hero is Kenneth Carter, Chairman of the Royal
Commission on Taxation. The Commission was established by John
Diefenbaker in the early '60s to curry favour with certain business
interests who had identified aspects of the tax system which impeded
their operations. In the view of many of his peers, Carter, a member of
the business and social establishments of Montreal and Toronto, turned
traitor to his class by producing a Report calling for the elimination of
numerous tax preferences in the Canadian tax system and for the full
taxation of capital gains. To quote one of his more moderate business
colleagues of the time, Montreal accountant Herbert Spindler: "It (the
Report) is probably fair, rational and even inevitable. And yet -
somehow it is rape."
As McQuaig makes clear in her book, tax reform, at least of the kind
envisioned by Carter, was by no means inevitable. After an initial period
of quiescence, the government was inundated with briefs and personal
representations from angered business leaders who threatened to take
their investments elsewhere. The most vehement attacks came from the
American multinationals in the mining and resource sectors. Carter had
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recommended an immediate end to depletion allowances, noting that
roughly 85 per cent of depletion allowances in 1964 were enjoyed by
only five mining companies and three oil companies. The American oil
companies were particularly anxious that no Canadian precedent be
established for action south of the border.
If the press was initially somewhat sympathetic, any support for the
reforms was eroded by the continuing play of stories of business
executives recounting the dangers of the reform proposals in public
speeches and before various parliamentary committees. All this left the
public with the impression that there must be a great deal wrong with the
proposals. The media failed to present an alternative view. Perhaps, as
McQuaig suggests, the media reflected the beliefs of its wealthy owners.
Another reason might have been that it simply did not have the expertise
to engage in an often highly technical debate. Furthermore, the
proponents of the Carter position lacked a presence. Carter himself was
dying from cancer, and the people who supported the Report were
outmanned and outgunned.
The years following tax reform in 1972 witnessed further erosion of
the already greatly watered-down versions of Carter's proposals which
had been enacted into legislation. The archvillain of the time, according
to McQuaig, was Marshall Cohen. He served in various capacities in the
Department of Finance, most notably in the influential post of Assistant
Deputy Minister for Tax Policy (1971-77) and finally as Deputy Minister
(1982-85). Urbane, connected, and a former tax practionner, Cohen,
during his tenure at Finance, espoused the "breathing room" philosophy
of tax policy. Part and parcel of this philosophy was the idea that if a tax
system becomes too "tight", the major players might just refuse to play
the "game." Clearly, McQuaig does not find this approach credible. She
rightly questions whether in fact investment and other business decisions
are as tax-driven as is sometimes argued. Her distaste for the philosophy,
however, prevents her fully exploring the arguments in its favour.
Furthermore, the portrait she draws of Cohen is a caricature that fails to
adequately illuminate the man and the milieu in which he wielded
considerable influence.
The only positive developments seen by McQuaig in the era since tax
reform were the proposals in Allan J. MacEachen's budget of November
1981. The budget, which was generally an exercise in base broadening
and loophole closing, infuriated the business community. Their attack
was intensified and partly justified by the fact that many of the budget
provisions were retroactive. As a result the tax rules would in certain
circumstances have changed half way before the completion of some
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business transactions. In any case, Finance beat a hasty retreat and
MacEachen lost his chance to be Prime Minister.
After MacEachen, the forces of reform were in disarray. Consultation
was in vogue, and it was largely with the advice and assistance of tax
experts from the private sector that the disastrous scientific research credit
programme was implemented. As unbelievable as it may seem, the
programme operated without any means of vetting the legitimacy of the
research programmes for which the government awarded generous tax
credits. The normal safeguard in a free enterprise system of investor
confidence was eliminated because the researcher who typically had no
significant tax liability was permitted to "sell" his unused tax credits. The
buyer, unlike a normal investor, was interested primarily in the tax break
and not the ultimate return on his "investment." Hence, the buyer had no
reason to stay around to see that the research was actually carried on in
a competent and timely manner. Thus the Canadian public sponsored
research to investigate the differences between black-and-white and red-
and-white cows, and contributed over five million dollars in tax credits to
computer "research" directed by a drop-out from an introductory
computer course at the University of Victoria. A lot of the research
simply did not get done. The drain on the Treasury was enormous. In the
less than ten months that the programme was officially in place, it cost
$2.8 billion. About a third of that amount, around $925 million, was
wasted and the rest went to projects ranging from the deserving to the
dubious. To put the numbers in perspective, McQuaig estimates that the
total federal spending on university research in all fields for that year was
about $540 million.
The last chapter of McQuaig's book is on Michael Wilson's recent "tax
reform." McQuaig's view is summed up in the title of the chapter:
Michael Wilson and the Hijacking of Tax Reform. McQuaig has two
main criticisms. First, she objects to the half nature of Wilson's reforms
which do, to some extent, reduce tax preferences and eliminate some
unfairness in the system. She contends that his reforms impact most
adversely on the middle class. Thus she cites, for example, the change
from personal tax exemptions to credits. Under the old system the
exemptions were worth more to higher income taxpayers (the amount of
the exemption multiplied by the marginal rate of tax) than to lower
income taxpayers. Credits will be worth the same to all taypayers (as long
as they have a tax liability equal to the credit or the credits are
refundable). However, the main losers, proportionally, will be the middle
class. This theme of the shift of tax onto the backs of the middle class also
underlies her second main criticism. Wilson's reforms involve the
introduction of a national sales tax to replace the obsolete and inefficient
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federal sales tax. The inevitable result will be that a greater proportion of
federal government revenues will be collected by a "regressive" sales tax
than through the "progressive" income tax system. Wilson will "protect"
lower income taypayers with a sales tax credit. Presumably the middle
class will be fair game since they have the choice to consume or save.
Since McQuaig's book has been written, a national election has been
fought and won by the Mulroney government. Whether or not it can be
said that Wilson's proposed reforms have been vindicated by the
electorate, it is clear that the future trend will be away from the operative
principles in the Carter Report of fairness and equity. To oversimplify,
the question has become "Why are the bad guys winning?" It is a
question for which McQuaig does not have a complete or satisfying
answer.
McQuaig's viewpoint is, not surprisingly for a mainstream journalist,
quintessentially liberal. (She has been called, I am sure to her
considerable amusement, a left-wing radical and a Marxist.) Her belief,
which infuses the whole book, is that if only people are informed, if only
they knew what had gone on, there would be true tax reform. Alas, there
is considerable evidence that the Canadian people know and have always
known that the system is unfair but continue to tolerate it.
McQuaig does cite some of the factors which seem to militate against
tax reform in this country. These include the role of the provinces, which
is generally not progressive, special interests and their special access to the
government, and the passivity and conservatism of the media. There is
also the problem that reform imposes a heavy burden on a politically
aware economic elite while promising relatively small benefits to the
masses. Although she makes short shrift of the economic arguments
concerning the "double taxation of savings" they deserve more time. She
ascribes relatively little importance to arguments that the Canadian and
American tax systems should be congruent. Given recent developments
in the free trade area, this is a curious omission. She ridicules what she
describes as the mythology of "business confidence." And yet in a world
in which capital is generally more mobile than labour, business
confidence, like it or not, is a factor with which governments must be
concerned. Finally, she does not recognize the ubiquitiousness of the
myth of upward mobility in our country and its effect upon pressure for
social and economic change. Some interesting American studies have
shown that changes in the tax system which would benefit the "losers"
have not been favoured by them because of their hope that sometime in
the future they might be able themselves to take advantage of the
loopholes.
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In the final analysis, even ff McQuaig cannot give a definitive answer
to the vexed question of "Why not true tax reform?," (and who can), she
does provide a valuable critique in the best muckraking tradition. Even
if to know is not enough impetus for change, it is a necessary first step.
Faye Woodman
Dalhousie Law School
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